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Abstract 
Researchers typically classify behavior as habitual if it occurs independently of changes 
in the value of its outcomes (revaluation test) or the impact it has on those outcomes 
(contingency degradation test). We argue that these tests are valid only if they (a) are sufficiently 
sensitive and (b) target the outcomes that might actually control behavior. These criteria 
resemble the sensitivity and information criteria that are widely adopted in research on learning 
without awareness. We argue that past and future evidence for habits should be evaluated in light 
of these criteria and illustrate this approach by applying the information criterion to the studies 
conducted by de Wit et al. (2007, 2013). In three experiments that were modelled after these 
studies, we used alternative revaluation and contingency degradation tests that targeted other 
outcomes than those targeted in the original studies. These alternative tests consistently provided 
evidence for knowledge of outcomes that could have controlled seemingly habitual behavior. 
Our results suggest that the revaluation test used by de Wit et al. (2007, 2013) did not meet the 
information criterion, which questions the validity of their conclusions regarding the habitual 
nature of the observed behavior. 
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Kicking the Habit:  
Why Evidence for Habits in Humans Might be Overestimated 
Habits are often thought to be the backbone of human behavior (see Wood & Rünger, 
2016, for a review). It has been argued that behavior is by default habitual, with non-habitual 
behavior arising only when people have the need and resources to deviate from the habitual 
response (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This point of view is definitely acceptable if habits are 
defined broadly as encompassing all behaviors that are emitted frequently or automatically (e.g., 
without conscious deliberation). However, habits have also been defined more narrowly as that 
subset of (frequent and automatic) behavior that is not goal-directed (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990; 
Wood & Rünger, 2016). These two definitions do not overlap because frequent and automatic 
behavior can be goal-directed (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). The distinction is also not 
trivial because different strategies must be used to influence behavior that is goal-directed versus 
habitual in the strict sense. Most importantly, whereas (frequent or automatic) goal-directed 
behavior can be changed by altering the outcomes it produces (e.g., making an outcome less 
desirable) or the impact it has on those outcomes (e.g., eliminating the impact of the behavior on 
the outcome), truly habitual behavior cannot. Despite these important differences, many 
researchers have maintained the claim that habits – even when defined in the strict sense – are 
the default mode behavior (e.g., Wood & Rünger, 2016). 
The validity of that claim hinges upon the ability to determine whether a behavior 
depends on goals. In line with the idea that true habits should be immune to changes in (the 
relation to) their outcomes, two tests have been used to identify habits: the outcome revaluation 
test and the contingency degradation test. In order to pass the outcome revaluation test, it needs 
to be demonstrated that a particular behavior is unaffected by changes in the value of its 
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outcomes. For instance, rats that received extensive training to obtain a sucrose reward by 
pressing a lever will continue to vigorously press this lever even after the sucrose was devalued 
by paring it with the induction of illness (e.g., Adams, 1982). The contingency degradation test, 
on the other hand, assesses the result of changes in the impact of the behavior on its outcomes. 
For instance, lever pressing is considered to be habitual if rats continue to press the lever that 
produced sucrose even if lever pressing no longer produces sucrose. 
Importantly, both the revaluation and the contingency degradation test are known to be 
problematic in that they require the demonstration of a null effect: the absence of an impact of 
changes in outcome value or behavior-outcome contingency (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990; Moors, 
Boddez, & De Houwer, in press; Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015). It is well known that null effects 
can be due not only to the absence of a specific target process (e.g., the absence of a goal-
directed process) but to a host of other factors such as inadequate manipulations or 
measurements (e.g., Colwill & Rescorla, 1990). Interestingly, the same problem arises when 
researchers wish to establish learning without awareness. More specifically, learning is 
considered to be unaware only when awareness tests fail to provide evidence for the presence of 
conscious knowledge of the contingencies that influence behavior. As in research on habits, the 
demonstration of unconscious learning thus hinges upon the demonstration of a null result.  
Unlike to what is the case in habit research, however, the problems associated with 
demonstrating a null effect have received a lot of attention in research on unconscious learning. 
Most importantly, it is now generally accepted that awareness tests should be evaluated with 
regard to the information and sensitivity criteria (Shanks & St. John, 1994; see Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002, for a third criterion). First, the information criterion specifies that the information 
that an awareness test is designed to capture should be the information that is responsible for 
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learning. For instance, awareness tests should assess not only conscious knowledge about the 
rule that the experimenter implemented in a certain task (e.g., an artificial grammar that 
generates grammatical letter strings) but also other conscious knowledge that is correlated with 
this rule (e.g., the fact that some pairs of letters are more likely to occur in grammatical than in 
ungrammatical letter strings; see Shanks & St. John, 1994). Second, an awareness test needs to 
meet the sensitivity criterion. This second criterion implies that a test is sensitive enough to 
capture relevant conscious knowledge. More specifically, an awareness test can be regarded as 
insensitive when it suggests that a specific piece of conscious knowledge is absent even when 
participants do possess such knowledge. Insensitivity could result from the fact that the 
awareness test does not create the optimal conditions for people to express their conscious 
knowledge. For instance, they might not be motivated to express their knowledge or the 
awareness test might differ from the learning context in ways that hamper the use of conscious 
knowledge (see Lovibond & Shanks, 2002, and Shanks & St. John, 1994, for more details).  
The introduction of the information and sensitivity criterion constituted a major step 
forward in research on learning without awareness because it set a new quality benchmark. After 
Shanks and St. John (1994) introduced these criteria (see Dulany, 1961, for a precursor of the 
information criterion), the quality of evidence for unconscious learning was evaluated on the 
basis of the extent to which researchers could argue that their awareness test was sensitive 
enough and probed for all relevant conscious knowledge. In this paper, we put forward the idea 
that research on habits would benefit in the same way from the introduction of quality criteria for 
revaluation and contingency degradation tests. More specifically, the quality of evidence for 
habits (in the strict sense) should be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which it can be argued 
that the revaluation or contingency degradation tests (a) target the outcomes that might actually 
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control behavior and (b) create the optimal conditions for observing an impact of those 
outcomes. In line with the literature on unconscious learning, we refer to these two criteria as the 
information criterion and sensitivity criterion for habit research. 
In the present paper, we illustrate the usefulness of the information criterion by applying 
it to a series of studies on habit learning that was conducted by de Wit and colleagues (de Wit, 
Niry, Wariyar, Aitken, & Dickinson, 2007; de Wit, Ridderinkhof, Fletcher, & Dickinson, 2013). 
In their studies, participants first completed an instrumental discrimination learning phase. On 
each trial of that phase, a box was presented with a piece of fruit (stimulus; S) pictured on the 
front. Participants pressed a left or right key (response; R) in order to open the box. Depending 
on whether their response was correct or incorrect, they either gained points and saw another 
piece of fruit inside the box (outcome; O) or they did not gain points and saw an empty box. 
There were three types of trials: congruent trials, in which the S and O were the same fruit; 
biconditional trials, in which S and O were different and did not have any other function within 
the experiment (i.e., Ss only functioned as Ss and Os only functioned as Os); and incongruent 
trials, in which the S and the O were different fruits that had different functions (S or O) within 
the experiment (see Table 1 for an example of the different possible trial types). 
Crucially, on incongruent trials, the same piece of fruit was related to different responses 
depending on whether it served as a stimulus or as an outcome. For instance, S1 (e.g., grapes) 
would lead to O2 (e.g., pineapple) after a left key-press and S2 (e.g., pineapple) led to O1 (e.g., 
grapes) after a right key press. de Wit et al. (2007, 2013) reasoned that if a goal-directed system 
would operate during incongruent trials, it would result in conflicting associations between fruits 
and responses (i.e., the same fruit would be linked with both left and right responses), thus 
leading to response conflicts and poor performance. A habit system, on the other hand, would 
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link each fruit with only one response (i.e., the response it was linked to when functioning as a 
S), thus eliminating ambiguity and facilitating performance on incongruent trials. Although 
learning might initially be based on a goal-directed system, the habit system would therefore 
quickly take over, thus leading to the formation of habits (also see de Wit et al., 2013, p. 781-
782). On other types of trials, a goal-directed system would not produce response conflicts and 
would thus be more likely to continue to play a prominent role. 
A revaluation test was used to examine whether behavior on incongruent discrimination 
trials qualified as habitual. On each trial of the revaluation test, participants saw two open boxes, 
each with a different type of fruit presented inside. One of the two fruits was presented with a red 
cross superimposed on it, signifying it had lost its value. The other fruit had not lost its value and 
would still lead to points. Participants were asked to select the response that caused the fruit that 
was not devalued. The logic behind this test was that if participants still chose the response that 
produced the devalued outcome, then the behavior cannot qualify as goal-directed (i.e., directed 
at the goal of obtaining the valuable fruit). Therefore, chance performance during the revaluation 
test would indicate the absence of goal-relevant knowledge and thus that above-chance 
performance during the discrimination learning phase was habitual. In several studies, de Wit et 
al. (2007, 2013) observed chance or below chance performance on incongruent revaluation trials 
and above chance performance on congruent and biconditional revaluation trials. Based on these 
findings, they concluded that performance on the incongruent discrimination trials was habitual 
whereas behavior on the congruent and biconditional discrimination trials was goal-directed.    
In three studies, we examined whether the revaluation test of de Wit et al. (2007) might 
have been suboptimal in terms of the information criterion. It is important to note that within the 
discrimination learning phase of de Wit et al. (2007) there were actually two outcomes on each 
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trial in which participants gave a correct response. First, there was the piece of fruit that was 
presented inside the box. Second, participants received 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 point(s) for each correct 
response, depending on the speed of their reactions. The importance of both outcomes was 
stressed in the instructions, but arguably the points were more salient than the fruits, because 
participants were explicitly asked to gain as many points as possible. It is therefore plausible that 
participants primarily focused on learning which response resulted in points when a certain 
stimulus fruit was presented on the outside of box. Hence, it is possible that during the 
discrimination learning phase, participants never exhibited habitual behavior but always pressed 
the key that they thought would deliver points. The fact that the revaluation test revealed a lack 
of knowledge about the outcome fruits of the incongruent trials might thus be irrelevant for 
determining the habitual nature of the behavior during the discrimination phase simply because 
that behavior did not depend on knowledge about the outcome fruits but on knowledge about the 
points that a response would deliver. Because the revaluation test might not have targeted the 
outcomes that actually drove behavior during the discrimination phase, it did not meet the 
information criterion and cannot be used to determine whether behavior was habitual. The fact 
that participants learned less about the outcome fruits of incongruent trials than those of other 
trials indicates that it is more difficult to learn about outcome fruits when the same fruits are 
related to multiple responses. But this difference would arise also if participants always selected 
responses with the aim to gain as many points as possible, that is, if their behavior was goal-
directed. 
In our studies, the discrimination learning phase was similar to that in the studies of de 
Wit et al. (2007, 2013) but we used a different revaluation test (Experiment 1) or a contingency 
degradation test (Experiments 2 & 3) that targeted knowledge about the point outcomes. In 
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Experiment 1, participants were told before the start of the revaluation phase that, from now on, 
every point earned would be deducted from the total number of points. In Experiments 2 and 3, 
after the discrimination learning phase, participants were told that response-point relations would 
be reversed (i.e., responses that previously led to points would no longer result in points whereas 
responses that previously did not lead to points would result in points).1 If behavior is driven by 
the goal to maximize the total number of points, participants should reverse their responses 
during these tests, also on incongruent trials.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. We tested 24 participants at Ghent University who were paid 5 euro for 
taking part in the experiment. All were native Dutch-speakers.  
Stimuli and Materials. We used the same stimuli as de Wit et al. (2007): eight colored 
pictures of different types of fruit (apple, bananas, cherries, coconut, grapes, pear, pineapple, and 
orange). The size of the fruit stimuli was 220 by 220 pixels. These stimuli were presented on a 
colored picture of a closed box (when they functioned as an S) or an open box (when they 
functioned as an O). The size of the box-pictures was 362 by 378 pixels. There were also three 
practice stimuli (colored pictures of a cup of coffee, a glass of beer, and a picture of a bottle with 
a glass of wine next to it of the same size as the fruit stimuli). All stimuli were presented on a 
black background and presented in the center of the screen. Above the boxes, a counter with the 
total number of points was presented. On correct trials, a yellow text box appeared indicating the 
                                                          
1 Note that this test involves a reversal of contingencies rather than a degradation (i.e., weakening) of contingencies. 
We will, however, continue to use the expression “contingency degradation test” because this term is commonly 
used in habit research to refer to procedures in which response-outcome contingencies are changed. 
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number of points that were earned on the trial. All text was presented in 18 point Courier New 
font.  
Participants were tested in a spacious room in which four computers were set up, 
separated by partitions. One, two, three or four participants were tested during each session. 
They were seated in front of a laptop PC with a 17 inch color monitor at a distance of 
approximately 45 cm. For stimulus presentation and response registration, we used the E-Prime 
software package (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a, 2002b). The program was started 
after participants gave their informed consent.  
Procedure. The experiment consisted of a practice block and an experimental block both 
of which involved a discrimination learning phase and a revaluation phase. First, participants 
were presented with instructions for the discrimination learning phase which stated that they 
could earn points by collecting objects from inside a box. They could open the box by pressing 
the left (D) or the right (K) key on the key board. A correct key press would reveal the object 
inside the box, whereas an incorrect key press would result in an empty box. Finally, they were 
told that the picture on the front of the box would provide a clue regarding the correct response.  
 A discrimination learning trial started with the presentation of a closed box with a picture 
of an object (i.e., a drink in the practice block; a piece of fruit in the experimental block) 
superimposed. It remained on the screen until participants pressed the D (left) or the K (right) 
key. Immediately after this, an open box was presented for 1000 ms, with either an object present 
inside (on correct trials) or nothing present inside (on incorrect trials). On correct trials, a yellow 
text-box appeared with the text “+ 1”. After this, the empty box was presented for 1000 ms, 
followed by a 1500 ms blank screen.  
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After the discrimination learning phase, participants were instructed that points that 
would be earned from that moment onwards would no longer be added but rather deducted from 
their total score. They were further instructed to avoid losing points and thus to keep their total 
score as high as possible. Furthermore, they would no longer receive feedback, but they would 
learn their total score at the end of the phase. Revaluation trials were similar to discrimination 
trials except that after a response was recorded, the trial ended and no feedback was given. The 
inter trial interval was 1000 ms.  
The practice phase consisted of ten discrimination learning trials, of which the first four 
were explicitly cued (i.e., participants were told which key to press; see de Wit et al., 2007). The 
experimental discrimination learning phase consisted of four blocks of 12 discrimination 
learning trials (yielding 48 trials in total). There were 36 revaluation trials.2 
For each participant, the different types of fruit were randomly assigned to a function (S 
or O) and to a trial type (congruent, incongruent, or biconditional). As can be seen in Table 1, 
                                                          
2 For exploratory reasons, at the very end of Experiments 1 and 2, we assessed knowledge about stimulus-outcome 
relations by asking participants to indicate which stimulus fruit was paired with which outcome fruit (i.e., “If this 
fruit was inside the box, which of the fruits below was presented on the front of the box?”). In Experiment 1, 
performance was above chance level for the biconditional trials (M = .69, SD = .36), t(23) = 2.58, p < .05, and the 
incongruent trials (M = .63, SD = .47), ts < 1, but not for the congruent trials (M = .63, SD = .47). Likewise, in 
Experiment 2, performance was above chance for biconditional trials (M = .71, SD = .33), t(21) = 2.88, p < .01, and 
congruent trials (M = .73, SD = .43), t(21) = 2.49, p < .05, but not for incongruent trials (M = .52, SD = .42), t < 1. 
Finally, in Experiment 3, performance was also above chance for the biconditional trials (M = .70, SD = .39), t(33) = 
2.87, p < .01, and for the incongruent trials, (M = .77, SD = .36), t(33) = 4.41, p < .001, but not for the congruent 
trials, trials (M = .62, SD = .45), t = 1.54. Experiments 2 and 3 also included an assessment of knowledge about 
response-outcome relations (i.e., “Which key did you need to press in order to find this piece of fruit inside the 
box”?”) that was administrated immediately before the assessment of stimulus-outcome knowledge. In Experiment 
2, performance was above chance for biconditional trials (M = .75, SD = .30), t(21) = 3.92, p < .01, and congruent 
trials, (M = .89, SD = .26), t(21) = 6.86, p < .001, but below chance for incongruent trials (M = .27, SD = .37), t < 
2.89, p < .01. In Experiment 3, performance was above chance level for biconditional trials, (M = .80, SD = .28), 
t(33) = 6.27, p < .001, for congruent trials, (M = .92, SD = .22), t(33) = 11.04, p < .001. Again, it was below chance 
level for incongruent trials, (M = .35, SD = .42), t(33) = 2.06, p < .05. Below chance performance on incongruent 
trials suggests that participants used stimulus-response knowledge rather than response-outcome knowledge to 
answer this question. Note, however, that knowledge about stimulus-outcome and response-outcome relations was 
assessed only after the revaluation or contingency degradation test in which no outcomes were presented. This might 
have interfered with memory for the relations in which the outcomes were involved. Hence, we refrain from drawing 
strong conclusions on the basis of the knowledge assessments.  
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there were two trials for each trial type, one requiring a left (D) response and another requiring a 
right (K) response. 
Results 
 Discrimination phase. We performed a repeated measures ANOVA with two within-
subjects factors: block (1, 2, 3, and 4) and trial type (biconditional, congruent, incongruent). 
Mean proportions of correct responses can be found in Table 2. There was a significant main 
effect of block, F(3, 21) = 59.84, p < .001, showing improved performance as participants 
progressed from block to block. The main effect of trial type approached significance, F(2, 22) = 
3.01, p = .06. Paired-sampled t-tests did not reveal a significant difference between performance 
on biconditional and congruent trials, t < 1, nor between biconditional and incongruent trials, t < 
1.52. However, in line with the findings of de Wit et al. (2007), participants did perform better 
on congruent, M = .85, SD = .11, than on incongruent, M = .78, SD = .14, trials, t(23) = 2.61, p < 
.05. The interaction between block and trial type was not significant, F < 1. 
Revaluation phase. Because all points earned during the revaluation phase were 
deducted from the total number of points, a response was classified as correct if it did not lead to 
points. A repeated measures ANOVA with trial type (biconditional, congruent, and incongruent) 
as a within-subjects factor did not reveal a significant effect of this factor, F < 1. Most 
importantly, performance was significantly above chance level for the biconditional trials, M = 
.87, SD = .28, t(23) = 6.44, p < .001; for the congruent trials, M = .89, SD = .28, t(23) = 6.63, p < 
.001; and for the incongruent trials, M = .85, SD= .29, t(23) = 5.92, p < .001. In other words, 
regardless of the type of trial, participants now selected the response that did not lead to points. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
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Participants. Twenty two students at Doshisha University took part in exchange for 500-
yen book coupons. All were native Japanese speakers. 
Stimuli, Materials, and Procedure. Stimuli, materials, and the procedure were the same 
as in Experiment 1 with two exceptions: Instructions were in Japanese and after the 
discrimination learning phase, there was a contingency reversal phase instead of a revaluation 
phase. Participants were told that in this phase, responses that previously led to points would no 
longer lead to points whereas responses that previously did not lead to points would now lead to 
points. Participants were asked to continue to maximize their total number of points  
Results 
Discrimination phase. The repeated measures ANOVA with block (1, 2, 3, and 4) and 
trial type (biconditional, congruent, incongruent) as within subjects factors yielded a significant 
main effect of block, F(3, 19) = 27.10, p < .001, showing that performance improved over 
blocks. There was also a significant main effect of trial type, F(2, 20) = 5.32, p < .05. Paired-
samples t-tests did not reveal a significant difference between performance on biconditional and 
congruent trials, t < 1, but performance was significantly better on biconditional, M = .84, SD = 
.14, compared to incongruent trials, M = .75, SD = .15, t(21) = 2.89, p < .01. Performance was 
also better for congruent, M = .84, SD = .14, compared to incongruent trials, t(21) = 3.07, p < 
.01. The interaction between block and trial type failed to reach significance, F < 1.07. The mean 
proportion of correct responses can be found in Table 3. 
Contingency reversal phase. We scored a response as correct if it resulted in an increase 
in the total number of points during this phase. The ANOVA did not reveal a significant effect of 
trial type, F < 1. Most importantly, performance was significantly above chance level for the 
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biconditional trials, M = .88, SD = .25, t(21) = 7.18, p < .001; for the congruent trials, M = .86, 
SD = .24, t(21) = 7.01, p < .001; and for the incongruent trials, M = .85, SD= .24, t(21) = 6.91, p 
< .001. 
Experiment 3 
 An anonymous reviewer correctly pointed out that the discrimination task in our studies 
differed in one notable manner from that in the original studies of de Wit and colleagues (2007, 
2013). Whereas in the original studies, the number of points earned on each discrimination trial 
depended not only on accuracy but also speed (ranging from 5 points for very fast responses and 
1 point for slow responses), in our studies only accuracy mattered (1 point for each correct 
response). We had implemented this change because a relation between speed and points during 
the discrimination phase might result in confusion when changing the value of the points 
(revaluation test) or the relation between responses and points (contingency reversal). For 
instance, participants might be uncertain about whether or how speed would influence the points 
they would earn or loose during the revaluation or contingency reversal test. One could, 
however, argue that rewarding speed during the discrimination task is crucial in building up 
habits. Hence, the lack of speed instructions might have prevented the formation of habits in our 
studies, which in turn might have allowed for more flexible, goal-directed behavior during the 
revaluation and contingency reversal tests. On the one hand, this alternative explanation does not 
undermine the potential of our studies to illustrate the merit of the information criterion in habit 
research: Our studies clearly show that knowledge about relevant outcomes (in this case, points 
produced by responses) will remain undetected unless revaluation and contingency reversal tests 
are used that specifically target knowledge about those outcomes. On the other hand, addressing 
this issue could help us establish whether habits develop during the discrimination learning task 
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that was developed by de Wit and colleagues. We therefore conducted a third study that 
incorporated the same contingency reversal task as Experiment 2 but did include a relation 
between speed of responding and number of points.  
Method 
Participants. Thirty three students at Doshisha University took part in exchange for 500-
yen book coupons. All were native Japanese speakers. 
Stimuli, Materials, and Procedure. Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 except 
on the following points. During practice and training, participants received 5 points for correct 
responses that were emitted within 1000 ms after the appearance of the stimulus fruit on the 
outside of a box. For each 500 ms that they were slower, they received one point less (i.e., 5 for 
< 1000; 4 for < 1500; 3 for < 2000; 2 for < 2500; 1 for slower responses). This relation between 
response speed and points was identical to that used in the original studies of de Wit et al. (2007, 
2013). As in Experiment 2, no feedback was given about the points that were earned during the 
contingency reversal phase. However, the feedback that participants received about their total of 
points at the end of the experiment did take into account the speed of the responses during the 
contingency reversal phase. 
Results 
Discrimination phase. The repeated measures ANOVA with block (1, 2, 3, and 4) and 
trial type (biconditional, congruent, incongruent) as within subjects factors again revealed a 
significant main effect of block, F(2.05, 65.46) = 30.32, p < .001, showing that performance 
improved over blocks. The main effect of trial type was also significant, F(2, 64) = 3.98, p < .05. 
As was the case in Experiment 2, paired-samples t-tests did not reveal a significant difference 
between performance on biconditional and congruent trials, t < 1, but performance was 
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significantly better on biconditional, M = .83, SD = .15, than on incongruent trials, M = .76, SD = 
.18, t(32) = 2.08, p < .05. Performance was also better on congruent, M = .83, SD = .15, than on 
incongruent trials, t(32) = 2.69, p < .05. The interaction between block and trial type approached 
significance, F(6, 192) = 1.89, p = .09 (see Table 4). 
Contingency reversal phase. We again scored a response as correct if it resulted in an 
increase in the total number of points during this phase. Unlike to what was the case in the 
previous experiment, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect of trial type, F (2, 64) = 6.51 (p < 
.01). Paired-samples t-tests showed that performance was significantly superior on congruent 
trials, M = .94, SD = .09, compared to biconditional M = .87, SD = .19, t(32) = 2.40, p < .05, and 
incongruent trials, M = .83, SD = .21, t(32) = 3.57, p < .01. However, performance on 
biconditional and incongruent trials did not differ significantly, t(32) = 1.12, p =.27. More 
importantly, performance was significantly above chance level for the each trial type: 
biconditional trials, t(32) = 11.36, p < .001; congruent trials, t(32) = 29.19, p < .001; and 
incongruent trials, t(32) = 9.01, p < .001. 
Discussion 
Despite the emphasis on speed of responding during the discrimination learning phase, 
participants again flexibly adjusted their behavior to changes in the relation between responses 
and points at the start of the contingency reversal phase, even for stimuli involved in incongruent 
contingencies. This finding confirms that participants can acquire relevant knowledge about 
point outcomes during the discrimination phase and use this knowledge in a flexible manner, 
even when using the exact same discrimination task as in the original studies of de Wit et al. 
(2007, 2013). At the general level, the results of Experiment 3 again illustrate the usefulness of 
the information criterion in habit research by showing that revaluation and contingency reversal 
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tests might miss knowledge about important outcomes unless the tests are specifically targeted at 
those outcomes. At the level of the nature of the responses during the discrimination task of de 
Wit et al, the results of Experiment 3 fail to support an alternative explanation of the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2. The fact that we still found flexible behavior during the contingency 
reversal test of Experiment 3 argues against the idea that the flexible behavior observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 occurred only because of the lack of speed instructions in those first two 
experiments.  
There was, however, one notable difference in the results of Experiments 2 and 3. 
Whereas performance during the contingency reversal test of Experiment 2 was comparable for 
all three trial types, in Experiment 3 participants performed significantly better on congruent 
contingency reversal trials than on both biconditional and incongruent reversal trials. One 
possible explanation of this discrepancy is that, because of the emphasis on speed, habits exerted 
some (albeit limited) impact on incongruent trials but not on congruent trials. However, such an 
account struggles with the observation that performance on biconditional reversal trials did not 
differ significantly from performance on incongruent reversal trials and was inferior to 
performance on congruent reversal trials. This is problematic because habit formation should be 
unlikely on biconditional trials and is typically considered to be a more optimal baseline for 
comparison with incongruent trials (de Wit et al., 2007, p. 5). A more plausible explanation is 
that the repetition of stimuli on congruent trials (i.e., the same fruit is presented as stimulus and 
outcome) facilitates the detection and memorization of the response-point relations for congruent 
fruits (e.g., the fact that a left response generates points in the presence of a cherry). This 
advantage on congruent compared to biconditional and incongruent trials (neither of which 
involves a repetition of fruits) is likely to manifest itself more as the discrimination task becomes 
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more difficult because of time pressure. Regardless of this issue, we can safely conclude that our 
results illustrate the merits of the information criterion for habit research and raise questions 
about the claim that the responses observed by de Wit and colleagues (2007, 2013) on 
incongruent discrimination trials are habitual in nature.  
General Discussion 
 In this paper, we put forward the proposal that the quality of the evidence for habits can 
be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which the revaluation and the contingency degradation 
tests meet the information and sensitivity criteria. Unless those tests target the right outcomes in 
a sufficiently sensitive manner, null effects on a revaluation or contingency degradation test do 
not provide strong evidence for the habitual nature of behavior. We also presented data which 
strongly suggests that at least one set of data that was previously interpreted as providing 
evidence for habits in humans (de Wit et al., 2007, 2013) can be criticized on the basis of the 
information criterion. Although the revaluation test that was deployed in these studies indicated 
that participants can solve incongruent discrimination problems even when they do not have 
knowledge of the relation between response and outcome fruits, this observation does not allow 
for the conclusion that discrimination performance was based on habits. We used revaluation and 
contingency degradation tests that targeted the points that participants could earn by giving the 
correct response, thereby showing that participants clearly knew which responses led to points 
and that they could immediately adjust their behavior when the value of the points (Experiment 
1) or the response-point relations (Experiments 2 and 3) changed. These findings strongly 
suggest that discrimination performance was driven by the goal to earn points and therefore was 
not habitual. 
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More generally, the present study illustrates the need to reevaluate also other evidence for 
habits in light of the information and sensitivity criteria. Doing so may well reveal that the scale 
and strength of the behavioral evidence for habits in humans is currently overestimated (see 
Moors et al., in press, for a broader discussion of this issue). Consider the finding that people 
who often eat popcorn when watching a movie in a cinema theatre will eat popcorn even when it 
is stale (Neal, Wood, Wu, & Kurlander, 2011). Although this observation suggests that, for those 
people, eating popcorn in a cinema is not driven by the goal to have tasty food, it does not 
necessarily imply that the behavior is habitual. For instance, it is possible that those people eat 
popcorn in order to have a complete cinema experience. If eating popcorn is driven by the goal to 
have a complete cinema experience, people will stop eating popcorn when having a complete 
cinema experience is no longer valued (revaluation) or eating popcorn no longer serves that goal 
(contingency degradation). Hence, it is possible that the revaluation test used in the popcorn 
study (devaluing the taste of popcorn) did not meet the information criterion. Although this 
alternative explanation is post-hoc, it can be tested empirically, for instance, by examining 
whether adding other elements that increase the cinema experience (e.g., the presence of friends, 
putting on 3D glasses) decreases the eating of stale popcorn. Adding those other elements 
reduces the functionality or need of eating popcorn to achieve a complete cinema experience 
(i.e., it degrades the relation between eating of popcorn and having a cinema experience) and 
could thus result in eating less popcorn when there are other reasons to not eat popcorn (i.e., 
when it tastes bad).  
 We want to emphasize that our arguments are not meant to discredit on an a priori basis 
all available behavioral evidence for habits in humans. Given the sheer volume and diversity of 
the evidence (see Wood & Rünger, 2016, for a review), the conclusion that humans can behave 
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in a habitual manner seems unavoidable. Nevertheless, it is essential that researchers use the 
highest possible standards when studying habitual behavior in humans and rigorously evaluate 
whether past and future evidence meets these standards. Concluding that behavior is habitual 
when it is not, not only distorts our view on the relative importance of habitual and goal-directed 
behavior in humans but also biases our understanding of the conditions that allow for processes 
that support habitual behavior. Moreover, for applied researchers, it is vital to know whether 
goals underlie (abnormal) behavior because it determines the ways in which they can influence 
behavior. Regardless of one’s current position regarding the role of habits in human behavior, 
habit research is therefore bound to benefit from a systematic application of the information and 
sensitivity criteria for revaluation and contingency degradation tests. 
 Critics may argue that the use of the information and sensitivity criteria sets the bar too 
high in that it might lead to many misses, that is, instances in which habits are classified as goal-
directed behavior. It should be clear, however, that the risk of misses in habit research is 
probably smaller than the risk of false positives (i.e., instances of goal-directed behavior that are 
classified as habits). The decision that a behavior is goal-directed can be substantiated by 
providing evidence for a significant change in behavior as the result of a change in the outcome 
value or the response-outcome relation. Although significant effects can be spurious, at least we 
know the probability of a Type I error. Even from the perspective of non-frequentist, Bayesian 
analysis, the absence of an effect is typically less diagnostic than the presence of an effect. 
Hence, also from this perspective, it seems more likely that researchers will fail to identify the 
goal-directed nature of behavior than to miss classifying a behavior as habitual. We therefore 
hope that the information and sensitivity criteria will become an important part of the toolbox of 
habit researchers.   
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Table 1. Example of possible trial types in the study of de Wit and colleagues (2007). 
 
Stimulus Response Outcome Trial Type 
Cherry D Cherry Congruent 
Pear K Pear Congruent 
Grapes D Pineapple Incongruent 
Pineapple K Grapes Incongruent 
Coconut D Orange Biconditional 
Banana K Apple Biconditional 
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Table 2. Mean proportion of correct responses and standard deviations in the discrimination 
learning phase of Experiment 1 
 
 Block 1   Block 2   Block 3   Block 4 
Trial type M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD 
  
Congruent .69 .24  .82 .21  .95 .10  .96 .10 
Incongruent .52 .25  .80 .21  .89 .18  .91 .19 
Biconditional .64 .33   .82 .17   .91 .16   .96 .12 
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Table 3. Mean proportion of correct responses and standard deviations in the discrimination 
learning phase of Experiment 2 
 
 Block 1   Block 2   Block 3   Block 4 
Trial type M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD 
  
Congruent .66 .28  .88 .17  .92 .16  .92 .19 
Incongruent .60 .18  .70 .26  .84 .18  .86 .23 
Biconditional .64 .23   .86 .20   .92 .14   .93 .11 
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Table 4. Mean proportion of correct responses and standard deviations in the discrimination 
learning phase of Experiment 3 
 
 Block 1   Block 2   Block 3   Block 4 
Trial type M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD 
  
Congruent .64 .27  .86 .18  .89 .22  .94 .15 
Incongruent .67 .24  .75 .28  .80 .21  .82 .24 
Biconditional .66 .25   .80 .21   .91 .17   .94 .17 
 
 
 
